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This paper proposes a new test to distinguish between the two leading theories of
discrimination: preference versus information. Discrimination based on preferences
occurs when people behave as if they refuse to change their stereotypes about the
capabilities of discriminated individuals. Those who discriminate based on information
are willing to alter their stereotypes. Using data from a quasi-experiment in South
Africa, I test for discrimination against women and non-whites. The preliminary results
show no discrimination against the former. In the case of racial discrimination, players’
stereotypes beneﬁt non-whites instead of white opponents, but they are reluctant to
change their impression for the former. However, they are willing to change their initial
impression about white opponents. This has severe implications about the permanency
of aﬃrmative action policies.
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collection. Gregg Dardagan helped with Epi Info 6. Michele Back helped me editing this manuscript. All
remaining errors are my own.“The economy of South Africa is like a two-storey house without a connecting
staircase” -Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa1.
1 Introduction
The persistent income inequality observed in several developing countries has led scholars to
pay attention to the existence of poverty traps2. However, the people at the bottom storey
of the house in resident Mbeki’s remarks are also of a diﬀerent race from those at the top,
creating the need for policies to empower those suﬀering from discrimination. Coate and
Loury (1993) show that deciding between a temporary or permanent aﬃrmative action policy
depends on how much employers’ negative stereotypes about the capabilities of discriminated
workers can be eroded. Hence, the eﬀectiveness of antidiscrimination policies depends on
how much people are willing to change their prior beliefs. The goal of this paper is to
estimate that willingness to change.
Recent work by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) is an example of the use of experiments
to test for discrimination3. In this study, the authors sent fake curriculum vitae in response
to employment ads, where the resumes were exactly the same except for the name of the
applicants. Some contained names associated with whites, such as Emily and Greg, and
others had names mostly associated with blacks, such as Lakisha and Jamal. The authors
found that “white names” received 50% more callbacks than “black names.”
We can imagine the process of employers reviewing the resumes sent by Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004) as a two-step approach. First, when Lakisha’s resumes arrives, a dis-
criminating employer infers her race by reading her name and uses a negative stereotype
(or prior belief) linked to her race, to guess Lakisha’s productivity. In the second step,
employers receive (noisy) information about Lakisha’s productivity by reading her resumes.
Employers who discriminate based on preferences are not inﬂuenced by the contents of the
resume. They behave as if they are unwilling to learn about her productivity, and discard her
resume. Other employers might change their initial belief when the contents of the resume
reﬂect “good signals” about her productivity but the new belief might be not high enough, so
her resume is still discarded. These employers are willing to learn, hence are discriminating
1October 9th, 2003, Black Management Forum address.
2See Carter and Barret (2005) and the references therein.
3See section two below for references of other papers in this area as well as alternative estimation methods
2based on information. The reasons of discrimination are diﬀerent in each case and require
diﬀerent policies. Therefore, knowing that Lakisha’s resume was rejected is clear evidence
of discrimination but does not tell us which policies would be more eﬀective to reduce it.
To understand the reasons explaining discriminatory behavior, this paper introduces a
model of learning as an analog of reviewing a resume. I model the behavior of a group of in-
dividuals who do not know each other. They have to make decisions based on an unobserved
ability when all they can see is the race, gender and age of their counterparts. Assuming
individuals are Bayesian learners, the proposed framework models agents as having prior be-
liefs or stereotypes about the ability levels for each observed characteristic (or combinations
of characteristics.) Individuals also observe a noisy signal about each player’s productivity.
After observing the signals agents have to decide which person has the lowest (or highest)
ability.
A diﬀerence in prior beliefs for each observed characteristic is the model’s measure of dis-
crimination. People who ignore the signals and keep their original stereotypes unaltered are
considered as discriminating based on preferences. These people refuse to change their beliefs
so their discriminatory behavior is not based on the revealed information. On the contrary,
those who change their beliefs are considered as discriminating based on information.
I test this theory using a quasi-experimental setting. The data comes from the South
African version of the television show The Weakest Link. In this show nine strangers compete
for a winner-take-all prize. The prize increases with the number of correct answers. Players
vote oﬀ one contestant at the end of each round. This paper shows how the data from the
The Weakest Link can be used to estimate player’s willingness to change their initial beliefs,
therefore allowing us to identify adequate policies to reduce discrimination in post-apartheid
South Africa.
Identifying the source of discrimination will help policy makers in two key areas. First, it
will suggest better policies to reduce discrimination, complementing the eﬀorts to eliminate
poverty traps. Second, these policies will have a positive impact on the empowerment of
non-whites, women, and other groups who suﬀer from discrimination.
The preliminary results show no discrimination by gender. With respect to race, players’
negative stereotypes are against white opponents, however players are willing to change their
beliefs after observing good signals. The opposite occurs regarding non-white opponents,
that is, the initial stereotype remains the same regardless of these opponent’s performance.
3Players are not willing to change their beliefs about non-white opponents.
Following this introduction, the paper is divided in seven more sections. Section two
brieﬂy reviews previous measures of discrimination. Section three presents the model and its
testable implication to distinguish between theories of discrimination. The data is described
in section four and the estimation strategy is presented in section ﬁve. The main ﬁndings of
the paper are shown in section six, followed by future extensions contained in section seven.
Section eight summarizes the ﬁndings of this version of the paper.
2 Previous measures of discrimination
Measuring discrimination is a diﬃcult task. During the apartheid era in South Africa and
before the Civil Rights movement in the United States, there were laws that separated groups
of the population. The discourse in the employment ads during those times also shows clear
evidence of discrimination (Darity and Mason 1998). The current absence of these events is
an improvement but does not imply discrimination has ended, rather that it is more subtle.
In economics, a common approach to measure discrimination is to decompose diﬀerences
in wages (or in labor force participation) for two groups into observed factors and unobserved
factors using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The observed factors include schooling and
experience in the labor force as well as the returns of these variables. The unobserved factors
are used as a proxy for discrimination. This methodology has been used in both developing
and developed countries4 and has the advantage of using household-level datasets, allowing
researchers to draw conclusions about the population. However, this approach has been
criticized as an inadequate approximation for discrimination because discrimination can
also aﬀect the observed factors such as schooling and experience in the labor force (Altonji
and Blank 1999). Thus, the unobserved diﬀerences might not capture the full extent of
discrimination.
Several alternatives have been explored to avoid this problem by using data from less
conventional sources. The goal of this literature is to measure discrimination directly. For
example, Ayres and Siegelman (1995) created audits where trained individuals from diﬀerent
races and genders bargained for a new car. The authors’ ﬁndings suggest that dealers quoted
4See for example Altonji and Blank (1999) for applications in the U.S. and Lam and Leibbrandt (2004)
and Casale (2003) for examples about South Africa.
4lower prices for whites than blacks or female buyers using identical scripted bargaining
strategies. Goldin and Rouse (2000) evaluate the impact of “blind” auditions on female
musicians in orchestras. They found that females have a much higher probability to move
to higher rounds of the auditions when performing behind a screen. The paper by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004) mentioned in the introduction also falls in this category.5
Three conclusions can be drawn from the literature searching for evidence of discrimi-
nation. First, in order to test for discrimination, scholars are moving away from traditional
household-level datasets. The studies mentioned above are closer to case studies and hence
cannot make inferences about the entire population. The advantage though, is to have
a clearer way of ﬁnding evidence of discrimination. Experiments are a good alternative to
household-level datasets in this ﬁeld. Second, unlike the Oaxaca-Blinder approach, the study
of discrimination using these new methods has focused mostly on the United States, with
almost no evidence from developing countries6. Third, all of these studies, including those
using the Oaxaca-Blinder approach from developed and developing countries, are mute with
respect to cause of discrimination. When evidence of discrimination is found, we do not
know the reasons driving this behavior.
Economists have two main theories to explain why people discriminate. The ﬁrst theory
comes from Becker (1971). Becker explains discrimination as related to individual’s pref-
erences or taste. These individuals prefer not to interact with those discriminated against;
hence, this approach has been labeled “preference or taste-based discrimination.” Providing
these individuals with information about the productivity of those suﬀering from discrimi-
nation will not change their discriminatory behavior. They behave as if they are unwilling
to change their prior beliefs or negative stereotypes. The second theory comes from the
simultaneous but independent work of Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972). This approach “can
be thought of as reﬂecting not tastes but perceptions or reality.” (Arrow 1972, p. 23.) Here
people use group identity, such as race, gender or age, as a proxy for unobserved ability.
Because this approach relies on the information available to employers, it has been labeled
“information-based” discrimination. In this case, agents do change their prior beliefs if we
provide them with enough information about the productivity of those discriminated against.
5See Anderson, Fryer, and Holt (2005) for a survey of experiments measuring discrimination.
6Moreno, ˜ Nopo, Saavedra, and Torero (2004) provides preliminary evidence of audit studies in Peru. See
also Frijters (1999) for South Africa.
5Distinguishing between the two theories is relevant in order to design policies to re-
duce discrimination. For example, to decide whether an aﬃrmative action policy should be
temporary or permanent it is crucial to know whether people’s negative stereotypes about
discriminated agents are subject to change. If agents are willing to learn, as in the case
of discrimination based on preferences, a temporary aﬃrmative action policy is needed to
provide gains to those suﬀering from discrimination. Otherwise, when agents are unwilling
to learn, these policies need to be permanent (Coate and Loury 1993). The model to test
for the willingness to change stereotypes is presented next.
3 The model and testable implications
3.1 A model of learning
The model presented here is a one of Bayesian learning that relies on Arrow (1973) and
Coate and Loury (1993). The idea is to have a group of individuals who do not know each
other but have to make decisions based on the other agents’ unobservable characteristics
(such as productivity or ability). This lack of information makes individuals approximate
these unobservable characteristics based on observable characteristics (such as race, age and
gender.) Agents also observe a “noisy signal” that is imperfectly related to productivity.
The Bayesian part of the model comes from the assumption about how agents learn.
First, for each observable characteristic, say, race, agents have a prior belief or stereotype
about the proportion of non-whites with “high” or “low” productivity and a corresponding
belief for whites. Agents have a probability distribution for the likelihood to observe a
”good” signal from a non-white with low (or a high) productivity, and similar distribution
for whites. All of these beliefs and probability distributions are predetermined and embedded
in the participant’s minds before meeting the other agents. Then information is revealed.
Each agent observes a noisy signal from each participant. Using this signal, together with
the priors and the probability distributions, each player constructs the posterior belief that
a person has a low or high ability following Bayes theorem.
Formally, let I be the number of individuals, indexed by i and let k be the index of the
other agents except i, which I will call “i’s opponents” so if i = 1, then k = {2,3,...,I}
Let j = {1,...,J} be the set of observable characteristics. For example, when j refers to
6gender then j = 1 refers to males and j = 2 to female. Let θj represent the unobservable
characteristic of a person in group j and assume that θj is binary: θj = 1 when ability is
high and θj = 0 when ability is low. I am also assuming that there is no heterogeneity within
each value of θj. Also, yjk denotes the observed quality of the signal from opponent k that
belongs to group j. When the signal is “good” yjk = 1, otherwise yjk = 0.
We turn now to the prior beliefs. Let Probi(θj = 0) = α0
ij be the probability that person
i’s belief is that players from group j have low ability. To save on notation let me erase
the i-subscript, so I will refer to α0
j instead. Let pj be the probability that player i relates
a “good” signal (yjk = 1) as coming from a high ability player from group j, and let qj be
analog for a low ability player. Assume that the noisy signal is observed S times, so the
number of good signals is given by Yjk =
PS yjk. The probability of observing Yjk follows
the below binomial distribution when a person has high ability:





j (1 − pj)
S−Yjk = hip(Yjk) (1)
and similarly for a person with low ability:





j (1 − qj)
S−Yjk = hiq(Yjk) (2)
The assumption of Bayesian updating deﬁnes the way agents update their beliefs. Let
α1
jk be the probability that player i assigns to her k-th opponent, belonging to group j, as
having a low ability after observing k’s signals summarized by Yjk. Formally,
Probi(player k ∈ j is low type |k has Yjk correct questions)
= Probi(θj = 0|Yjk)
=
Probi(Yjk|θ = 0)Probi(θj = 0)













where hip( ) and hiq( ) are functions deﬁned in equations (1) and (2) respectively. The pos-
7terior probability α1
jk is then a function of the structural parameters of the model (α0
j,pj,qj)
for all j, as well as the information revealed from each opponent in the form of Yjk for all k
and all j.
Note that when pj = qj for some j equations (1) and (2) are identical. Hence in equation
(3) the functions hiq and hip cancel out from the numerator and denominator. What is left
in equation (3) is α0
j in the numerator and α0
j + 1 − α0
j in the denominator. This in turn
implies that the posterior probability α1
jk is equal to the prior probability α0
j for all k ∈ j.
3.2 Testable implications
A test for discrimination can be developed by observing diﬀerences in prior beliefs. If person
i believes that an opponent from group j has a higher probability to be a low ability player
than an opponent from group t, one might say that is evidence of discrimination against
members of group j. This is captured in the following deﬁnition
Test 1 (Test for discrimination) If α0
j > α0
t for some t  = j then members of group j are
discriminated against.
To distinguish between theories of discrimination we rely again on the values of pj and
qj and consider the extreme case described above, where pj = qj. We now can present our
way to distinguish between theories of discrimination:
Test 2 (Unwillingness to change) Assuming we found evidence of discrimination against
members of group j, in Test 1, then if pj = qj the discrimination is based on preferences.
As showed above, if for some j we have pj = qj it implies that the prior and the posterior
are the same. In this case, agents behave as if they refuse to update their beliefs. The
revelation of information, through the noisy signal, does not aﬀect their decision. The
discrimination is not related to information, it is a matter of preferences. This is reasoning
behind Test 2. It is then straight forward to show how to test for discrimination based on
information, as the alternative hypothesis to Test 2.
Test 3 (Willingness to change) Assuming we found evidence of discrimination against
members of group j in Test 1, then if pj  = qj the discrimination is based on information.
8Under Test 3 agents do update their beliefs, hence if we provide them with enough
information about their opponents’ performance their priors will change. Agents for whom
pj  = qj discriminate because they do not have enough information about their opponents,
not because they refuse to learn 7.
This simple model of Bayesian learning creates a framework to test for discrimination
but also to distinguish between theories of discrimination. The data to be used to test this
theory in post-apartheid South Africa is presented below.
4 Data sources
The model presented above is simple but general enough so it can be applied in diﬀerent
scenarios where agents receive a noisy signal and have chance to update their priors. In
addition to this we need a setting where agents have a chance to reveal their posterior
beliefs. This is a hard task because it requires a particular set up. Hence to test the theory
I use data from the South African version of the TV show The Weakest Link.
The Weakest Link is a winner-takes-all television game where nine contestants answer
several trivia questions. These contestants have a decreasing amount of time to answer
as many questions as possible in each round. At the end of a round, each player decides
individually, secretly and simultaneously who to vote oﬀ the game. When the votes are
revealed, the person with the highest number of votes against them leaves the game. The
remaining contestants keep answering questions and eliminating one player per round until
two players are left. Within these two players, the one who in the ﬁnal stage answers the
most questions correctly wins. The prize is a function of the number of correct questions
throughout the game8 They can win a maximum of R60,000, approximately US$10,000 or
US$ 21,200 using PPP.
The game has all the components needed to estimate the model in section 3.1. First,
the participants do not know each other before playing the game, which is a requirement for
players to have priors based on observables believable. Second, players are drawn from all
groups in the South African population in terms or race, gender and age (18 and above).
7I section six I explore, for those who update their priors, how fast or slow they update in order to have
a broader sense of the distinction between the two competing theories.
8The prize is the amount of “banked” money, and baking is allowed after a correct answer.
9Third, players have to identify their opponents’ ability to ﬁnd out who is the weakest link
(i.e. the player with the lowest ability) and who is the strongest link (i.e. the player with
the highest ability). Fourth, this “ability” is observed as a noisy signal in the form of the
number of questions answered correctly. Answering a question is considered a noisy signal
because the questions’ diﬃculty is not homogenous. The observed performance of each player
becomes a random variable. Fifth, at the end of each round, players reveal their posterior
probabilities by their voting patterns which in principle we can assume reﬂects their choice
regarding who they think is the weakest link.
Another advantage of using this game is the prizes which are much higher than the
ones used in experiments. The costs of using this game are similar to the ones found in
the new literature detecting discrimination as described in section one. The sample is not
nationally representative and the demographics do not necessarily match the population
distribution. However, I believe the beneﬁts exceed the costs. The possibility of applying
methods that were -up to now- applied to developed countries, along with the availability of
a methodology that allows for the identiﬁcation of the underlying reason for discrimination
is worth pursuing. The beneﬁts increase as this paper analyzes the case of post-apartheid
South Africa.
Note that the approach used here diﬀers from the methodology used by Levitt (2004) and
Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh (2004). These authors used data from the U.S. version of
the show to distinguish between theories of discrimination by analyzing the dynamic feature
of the game. They argue that players would ﬁnd it optimal to eliminate the weakest players
in the early rounds because the prize increases with the number of correct answers. Towards
the end of the game the desire to win might become more important for players and they
will vote oﬀ the strongest players instead. However, the dynamics might imply strategies
contrary to the ones argued in their papers due to issues such as reputation, punishments and
disclosure of information. Here I focus on the feature of the game related to the development
of information whose consequences are formally presented in the model of section 3.1. To
avoid the role of history, I use the voting patterns from the ﬁrst round only9.
9For example, vengeance can be a motive for a player to vote oﬀ an opponent who voted against her in
previous round. Also, from round two onwards the player with the highest number of correct questions in
the previous round start the next round, so it is made public who the strongest player is after each round.
Finally, once the votes are made public (and before asking the voted oﬀ person to leave the game) the show’s
host interviews two or three participants (at her discretion) asking them about their reasons for their vote
10The data is collected from videotapes of three seasons. I prepared a questionnaire to
capture the data (available upon request.) There are 16-18 shows per season, once we
exclude the shows where celebrities play for charity. With three seasons so far, the sample
size has around 450 players. Season three is currently being broadcasted in South Africa.
This season will run until the end of May. For this version of the paper I will use data only
from the ﬁrst season. The main variables and their basic statistics are shown in Table 1
below.
Table 1: Basic Statistics
Variables Type Nobs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
White Binary 135 .733 .444 1.00 .000 1.00
Male Binary 135 .533 .501 1.00 .000 1.00
Age Years 135 34.95 11.01 31.00 19.00 74.00
Johannesburg Binary 135 .400 .492 .000 .000 1.00
Traditional cloth Binary 135 .015 .121 .000 .000 1.00
Questions Number 135 2.70 .519 3.00 2.00 4.00
Correct answer Number 135 1.91 .851 2.00 0.00 4.00
Correct answers Proportion 135 .710 .288 .667 .000 1.00
Voted oﬀ Binary 135 .370 .485 0.00 0.00 1.00
Votes against Number 135 1.00 1.82 0.00 0.00 8.00
There are 135 participants in the ﬁrst season of the show. Whites are over represented in
the sample and they account for almost three quarters of the players. However, the sample
is almost evenly distributed in terms of gender. The players’s age ranges from 19 to 74 years
old. Most players are from the Johannesburg-Pretoria area which is the ﬁnancial center of
South Africa. Very few of them wore “traditional clothes.” Players have two minutes and
50 seconds to answer as many questions as they can in the ﬁrst round, so the total number
of questions varies by participants10. The median player answers three questions and very
few answer two or four questions. On average players answer two questions correctly and
changing which might change the information set of the remainder participants. None of this occurs in round
one.
10Hence S is not ﬁxed and for the estimation we use Si in equations (1) and (2).
11the proportion of correct answers is just above 70%. The last two rows in Table 1 show that
more than a third of the participants were voted oﬀ, that is, they received at least one vote
against, however the distribution of the number of votes received is skewed to the left. The
next section explains how to use this data to evaluate the model presented in section three.
5 Estimation
To estimate the structural parameters of the model (α0
j,pj,qj; for all j) I will use maximum
likelihood methods. Let dijk = 1 if individual i votes against opponent k that belong to group
j and dijk = 0 otherwise. Under the assumption that players ﬁnd it optimal to eliminate the
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jk is the function deﬁned in equation (3) and N is total number of players, also
parameters in bold reﬂect vectors.
To test for discrimination and to distinguish between theories of discrimination I will use
the Likelihood Ratio, where the hypotheses are described in Tests 1 to 3 above. The Likeli-
hood function described in equation (4) is highly non-linear due to the binomial distribution
of Yjk together with the Bayes rule to update the posterior probability in equation (3). In
Proposition 1 below, I show that all the parameters are identiﬁed because α1
ijk is not a linear
function of the structural parameters.
Proposition 1 (Identiﬁcation) The set of parameters Ψ = (α0,p,q) is fully identiﬁed.
Proof. Suppose not. If the parameters are not identiﬁed, adding a non-zero vector δ in
equation (3) would not aﬀect its value. This is equivalent to have α1
ijk(Ψ + δ) = α1
ik(Ψ) +
12α1
ijk(δ) which in turns requires α1
ijk( ) to be a linear function. But as shown by equation (3),
α1
ijk( ) is not linear with respect to α0
j,p,q which contradicts the initial statement.
The structural parameters αj,pj,qj, for all j, are probabilities and hence limited to take
values between zero and one. To insure that I assume that each can be expressed as a logistic




1 + eγm (5)
6 Results
6.1 Performance and voting patterns
As mentioned in section four, player performance is not homogenous. Figures (1) and (2)
show how the proportion of correct answers varies by race and gender, respectively. White
players have a higher probability of getting more questions right and there is no major
diﬀerence in the distribution when comparing genders. Table 2 below complements the
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Figure 2: Performance by gender
Column (1) relates players characteristics with their performance measured by whether
the player was the weakest link (i.e. the player with the worst performance) or not. None
of the players’ characteristics correlates with such a measure of performance. In column (2)
we measure performance as the proportion of correct answers. We ﬁnd that white and older
players have a lower probability of being the weakest links. Gender has no role explaining
this measure of performance.
Columns (3) to (8) refer to the voting patterns. Column (3) shows that the probability
of receiving at least one vote is higher for non-white players. Since they also have a lower
performance in columns (4) and (5) we control for that by including the two previous deﬁ-
nitions of performance. Once we do that there are no diﬀerences in being voted oﬀ by the
race of the player, but age shows a signiﬁcant correlation with being voted oﬀ. Similarly,
column (6) shows that the number of votes received is higher for non-whites, but the racial
diﬀerence disappears after controlling for performance. This might suggest that players are
not indiﬀerent to the information revealed in the game.
14Table 2: Performance, votes and observable characteristics
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept -0.099 n.a -0.378 -1.039 1.218 0.852 -0.466 1.517
(0.550) (0.409) (0.457) (0.546) (0.320) (0.360) (0.308)
Male=1 0.265 -0.006 0.054 -0.046 0.070 0.121 -0.122 -0.115
(0.278) (0.027) (0.227) (0.246) (0.276) (0.177) (0.187) (0.181)
White=1 -0.352 0.074 -0.523 -0.426 -0.280 -0.434 -0.182 -0.071
(0.284) (0.032) (0.260) (0.282) (0.305) (0.188) (0.198) (0.191)
Live in -0.161 -0.002 -0.043 -0.011 -0.080 -0.291 -0.190 -0.019
Johannesburg (0.280) (0.027) (0.231) (0.248) (0.279) (0.186) (0.187) (0.192)
Age (yrs) -0.024 0.003 0.012 0.022 0.039 -0.015 0.001 0.018
(0.017) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Weak player 1.950 2.036
(0.417) (0.183)
Prop. of correct -4.036 -3.719
answers (0.651) (0.320)
No. obs : 135 1351 135 135 135 135 135 135
(Pseudo) R2 0.066 0.067 0.028 0.192 0.362 0.034 0.286 0.366
Column (1) Probit: Weakest player, marginal eﬀects
Column (2) Tobit: Proportion of correct answers, marginal eﬀects
Columns (3)-(5) Probit: Voted oﬀ, marginal eﬀects
Columns (6)-(8) Poisson: Number of votes received
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
156.2 Discrimination and its sources
We now present the estimates for the structural parameters of the model to test for dis-
crimination and it sources. In this version of the paper I will focus on the racial and gender
diﬀerences in votes, leaving the analysis of discrimination by age for future versions of the pa-
per. Table 3 and 4 show the estimates for the parameters α0
j,pj,qj when j = {men,women}
and when j = {whites, non-whites}, respectively.
Table 3: Estimates for gender discrimination, by groups
Sample of voters
Parameters All Whites Non-whites Men Women
α0
women .028 .019 .300 .042 .030
(.027) (.007) (.346) (.052) (.013)
α0
men .086 .074 .139 .151 .048
(.058) (.059) (.177) (.132) (.050)
pwomen .970 1.00 .630 .918 1.00
(.091) (1.5E-4) (.323) (.113) (3E-4)
pmen .823 .841 .736 .735 .892
(.097) (.101) (.279) (.167) (.115)
qwomen .857 1.00 .199 .613 1.00
(.391) (8.1E-4) (.230) (.374) (.001)
qmen .419 .428 .358 .301 .560
(.172) (.197) (.340) (.192) (.310)
Nobs. 135 99 36 72 63
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Maximum likelihood estimates.
For both tables, the ﬁrst column presents the estimates using the full sample. In the
case of gender, the players’ beliefs that men and women are low-ability players (i.e. α0
j) is
less than 10%, but are higher when looking at diﬀerences in races in table 4. In both tables,
the point estimates for pj (i.e. the probability that a good signal comes from a high-ability
player) are bigger than qj (i.e. the probability that a good signal comes from a low-ability
player).
16Also, there are interesting diﬀerences on how these perceptions change by groups in
both tables, but they could be related to the precision of the estimates due to diﬀerences in
sample size.
Table 4: Estimates for racial discrimination, by groups
Sample of voters
Parameters All Whites Non-whites Men Women
α0
nw .021 .019 .156 .026 .017
(.008) (.009) (.282) (.031) (.010)
α0
w .164 .147 .213 .163 .167
(.100) (.110) (.217) (.137) (.146)
pnw 1.00 1.00 .778 .995 1.00
(1.2E-4) (2.0E-4) (.311) (.132) (1.8E-5)
pw .725 .753 .643 .760 .675
(.119) (.128) (.283) (.136) (.219)
qnw 1.00 1.00 .350 .979 1.00
(6.1E-4) (.001) (.426) (.566) (1.1E-4)
qw .277 .279 .256 .263 .284
(.124) (.146) (.240) (.152) (.209)
Nobs. 135 99 36 72 63
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Maximum likelihood estimates.
nw=non-whites, w=whites.
The estimated parameters of these two tables allow us to perform the tests described in
section 3.1. We ﬁrst test for the existence of discrimination following Test 1. The results are
presented in table 5. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the prior beliefs (α0
j) are the
same for both genders, suggesting no evidence of gender discrimination. This results holds
for all sub-samples.
The ﬁndings are diﬀerent when we look for racial discrimination. The bottom panel of
table 5 shows that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal priors for diﬀerent races. This
is evidence of discrimination by race. There two important issues to mention here. First,
the existence of racial discrimination does not hold for all sample divisions (each column
in table 5). Only whites and women voters exhibit evidence of racial discrimination, while
17non-whites and men do not. However, as mentioned before we have to take into account the
diﬀerences in sample size. Including the other two seasons of the show will help to identify
this issue more accurately.
Table 5: Tests for discrimination
Sample of voters
Groups All Whites Non-whites Men Women
Gender
Statistic .947 2.29 .195 .710 .181
p-value .331 .130 .659 .399 .670
Race
Statistic 7.31 4.83 .023 1.50 4.15
p-value .007 .028 .879 .220 .042
H0 : α0
j = α0
t. Critical value: χ2
95%(1) = 3.84
The second important issue is related to the identiﬁcation of the racial group that is
discriminated against. Table 4 shows that the prior probability that whites are low-ability
players is higher, not lower, than the corresponding prior for non-whites. This suggest that
those who are discriminated against are the white players, not the non-white players. This
feature is found also when looking at the estimates from white and women voters. In section
seven I discuss the appropriateness of this test for discrimination11.
In table 6 we present the results of the tests to identify the sources of discrimination.
Since we only ﬁnd racial discrimination we limit the tests to whether players are willing to
11It is possible that this result might be caused by a sample selection problem. To appear in the show
people need to send an application and the producers of the select a smaller sample out of the pool of
applicants. It might be the case that the discrimination against white reﬂect the characteristics of the
sample. I plan to interview the producers of the show to learn more about the selection of the contestants,
to understand better this issue. A second explanation for this surprising result could be associated with
the strategy followed by the players. I assumed that players ﬁnd it optimal to eliminate the weakest player
because the having better players increases the chances of having a higher prize at the end of the game. But
players might ﬁnd optimal to do the opposite: vote oﬀ the strongest players because they also want to win
the game. In section seven I present a test to evaluate which strategy is represents the data better. Also, in
the appendix I show the conditions for players to select each strategy.
18change their negative stereotypes regarding white and non-white opponents. The results
suggest that players behave as if they are willing to change their initial beliefs with respect
to whites but not with respect to non-whites. We strongly reject the null hypothesis that
pj = qj for the former but not for the latter. This result holds across all subgroups where
we found evidence of discrimination, but also for men. Non-white voters, however, do not
discriminate as stated before but also are willing to update their beliefs about both types of
players: whites and non-whites.
Table 6: Testing theories of discrimination: race
Sample of voters
Groups All Whites Non-whites Men Women
Non-whites
Statistic 2.7E-4 1.2E-5 6.88 .001 3.8E-4
p-value .987 .997 .009 .970 .985
Whites
Statistic 127 87.7 22.7 77.6 44.0
p-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
H0 : pj = qj. Critical value: χ2
95%(1) = 3.84
These results imply that while players’ initial beliefs favor non-whites, they are not willing
to change that belief in the presence of good or bad information. Consider, for example,
the case of an average player facing two opponents: one white and one non-white. This
player believes that the probability that his white opponent is a low-ability contestant is
0.164 (from table 4) and 0.021 for his non-white contestant. If both players answer all three
questions correctly and given the estimates for pj and qj for each race, the posterior for the
non-white opponent will remain the same (0.021) but for the white opponent, the posterior
falls to 0.011 which is almost half of the one for non-whites. Non-white players with good
signals will be eliminated instead of white players with the same good signals. The next
section describes four extensions to be implemented in future versions of this paper.
197 Future extensions
The extensions contained in this section will be part of future versions of the paper.
7.1 Observed heterogeneity
So far to account for heterogeneity the sample was divided into diﬀerent groups as shown
in the tables above. The main drawback of this approach is the lack of testing for dif-
ferences in behavior by the characteristic of the voters. The model can be extended to
include complementary demographic characteristics of the decision makers but also to allow
for characteristics of their opponents. Let xi and zjk be the vectors of demographics char-
acteristics of player i and her k-th opponent, respectively. Equation (5) can be modiﬁed so
γm = x′
iβm + z′
jkλm making β and λ shifters aﬀecting the structural parameters.
7.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
It is possible also to allow for unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that for each player the
prior is a random draw from a known distribution F(α0














this expression for the posterior replaces the one in equation (3). Once this new expression
is included in the likelihood function (Eq. 4) we can use Bayesian methods to estimate the
posterior.
7.3 An alternative test of discrimination
Let us return now to the way to test for discrimination. In Test 1 diﬀerences in prior beliefs
is taken as evidence of discrimination. However, it might be the case that a higher prior
reﬂects an accurate knowledge of the environment rather than discrimination. Consider the
case when j indexes races applied to South Africa. A well informed agent who knows that
Africans received a lower quality education during the apartheid era might have a α0
j=african
higher than for other races, reﬂecting her beliefs that African participants have a higher
20probability of having low ability due the restrictions faced during the apartheid regime. It is
possible then to have diﬀerent priors for each j without discriminating, necessarily, against
any group12. This might explain why we found discrimination against white using our initial
deﬁnition of discrimination. An alternative deﬁnition of discrimination can be found below
in Test 4.
Test 4 (Alternative test for discrimination) If either qj < qt or pj < pt for any t  = j
then members of group j are discriminated against.
The idea behind this deﬁnition of discrimination is that, conditional on the (unobserved)
ability, agents of all groups are identical. If two opponents, one from group j and the other
from group t have a low ability, the probability of having a good or a bad signal (yjk)
from each of them must be the same in the absence of discrimination because there is no
heterogeneity within each level of ability. Note that this result does not arise from the
discrete values of the ability parameter θ. This result holds even in the case when θ is a
continuous variable.
7.4 Players’ strategy
Finally, a key assumption throughout the paper was that during the ﬁrst round of the game
the players’ strategy is to vote oﬀ the weakest player. It is possible to test for the accuracy
of this assumption. To do that the likelihood function in equation (4) can be modiﬁed to
allows for diﬀerent rules (voting the weakest or the strongest link) in the voting pattern and
hence identify in the data which strategy described the observed behavior better.
Pikj = Probi(vote weak player|rule 1)Probi(rule 1)











Using equation (7) the likelihood function changes to:








Future versions of the paper will include this test.
8 Conclusions
“Not to know is bad. Not to wish to know is worse.” -Wolof proverb.
This paper proposes a new test to distinguish between theories of discrimination: prefer-
ences versus information. Using a model of learning, players are assumed to have negative
stereotypes or prior beliefs about their opponents’ unobserved productivity. Discrimination
based on preferences takes place when players behave as if they refuse to update their initial
beliefs. Those who do change their beliefs are seing as discriminating based on information.
The preliminary results from South Africa described in this paper show no evidence
of discrimination against women, but the evidence regarding racial discrimination is more
complex. Players have a prior belief that beneﬁts non-whites instead of whites but they are
reluctant to change their impression for the former. Good or bad signals about non-white
opponents have no impact on players’ behavior. The contrary is found for the case of white
opponents. A good white opponent will have a lower probability of being voted oﬀ compared
to a good non-white opponent.
Several extensions have been mentioned in section seven and they will be part of future
versions of this paper. The current results, however, have severe implications in terms of the
permanency of aﬃrmative action policies. The fact that players are not willing to update
their stereotypes about non-whites could be used as an argument for long-term aﬃrmative
action policies.
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24A Strategies
Consider the simple game where there are three players and they have to vote-oﬀ one player.
The remainder two players compete for the prize where the winner takes it all. Player i has
to decide who to vote oﬀ: player A or player B. If A is voted-oﬀ, two situations can occur.
With probability 1−ωb, player i losses and gets zero. With probability ωb she wins and her
expected payoﬀ is δbz1+(1−δb)z2 where z1 and z2 are the low and high payoﬀs respectively,
and δb reﬂects the probability of achieving the low payoﬀ z1.
If B is voted oﬀ, i will face player A in the next round where the payoﬀs are the analogs
to the above ones with probabilities ωa and δa instead. Player i’s choice are depicted in
Figure 3.









δaz1 + (1 − δa)z2
Figure 3: Player i’s choices
Let us now assume that ωb > ωa and that δb > δa. The former states that player i has a
bigger chance of winning if facing player B and the latter implies that the high prize is more
probable when playing with player A. These assumptions imply that player A is a better
player than B. It is more diﬃcult to win when playing against her but the expected prize
increases.
If player i decides who to vote oﬀ by maximizing her expected value she will vote oﬀ
player A if and if:
ωb
ωa
≥
δa(1 −
z1
z2) − 1
δb(1 −
z1
z2) − 1
(9)
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